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A glimpse of China’s ‘export machine’ at Ningbo port in Zhejiang province. Reuters

Chinese goods seem to be everywhere these days.

Author

Consider this: At the Olympics in Rio this summer, Chinese companies supplied the
mascot dolls, much of the sports equipment, the security surveillance system and
the uniforms for the volunteers, technical personnel and even the torchbearers.
Penelope B. Prime

Do you own a personal computer or air conditioner? Or a pair of shoes or set of plates
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from WalMart? They all almost certainly bear a “Made in China” label.
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Put another way, China has become an “export machine,” manufacturing an
increasing share of the world’s products. Its initial success exporting in the 1990s –
which surged after it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 – surprised everyone, including
Chinese policymakers. The result was rapid growth of over 9 percent for many years. In 2014, China
surpassed the U.S. as the largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power parity.
How did a country with a national income of just US$155 per capita in the 1970s turn into one of the
most economically powerful countries in just 40 years? The answer not only shines light on China’s
success story but also offers some important lessons for governments considering a turn inward, such
as the incoming Trump administration.
I visited China for the first time in the spring of 1976 – just before China’s renewed entry into global
markets. Research, teaching and taking students to China over the following decades have given me a
https://theconversation.com/whatchinasexportmachinecanteachtrumpaboutglobalization63608
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window to observe the dynamic development that has occurred. And now, as a clinical professor at
Georgia State University and director of the nonprofit China Research Center, I am involved with
research and outreach that informs policy and business to strengthen U.S.China relations.

Much of the Rio Olympic Games was made in China, including the uniforms. Reuters/David Gray

The costs of isolation
Historically, China has nurtured strong connections to world commerce.
From the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.  A.D. 220) until the Ming (A.D. 13711433), goods, culture and
religion flowed among Central Asia, the Middle East and China via the various overland routes of the
Silk Road. Sea exploration began in the Ming Dynasty, when the famous Captain Zheng He took seven
voyages to establish trading contacts with Africa, Arabia, India and Southeast Asia. In the early
1900s, Shanghai was nicknamed the “Paris of the Orient” based on its role as a center of trade and
finance.
But after Mao Zedong led the communists to victory in 1949, China established a planned economic
system, withdrawing from global markets, which the communists deemed capitalist and imperialist.
Foreign assets were nationalized and companies left the country. Trade increased with the communist
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the 1950s, but that was sharply curtailed with the Sino
Soviet split in the early 1960s. The U.S. did not even have official trade links with China between 1950
and the early 1970s.
From Mao’s point of view, China’s goal was to build a strong economy by being selfsufficient in
production of all its needs. He believed that selfsufficiency should even extend to each province as
well. His “plant grain everywhere” policy, regardless if the geography was illsuited for it, is an
https://theconversation.com/whatchinasexportmachinecanteachtrumpaboutglobalization63608
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example of how far he implemented this strategy. One consequence was the disastrous Great Leap
Forward, in which an estimated 30 million or more died from famine.
This disaster resulted partly from pushing selfreliance in industry in the countryside, as well as
setting impossible grain output goals. The idea of specialization of production based on relative
efficiency of resources was seen as capitalist and dangerous to communist development. To benefit
from specialization, China would need to depend on other countries and deal with competition. As a
result of rejecting specialization and trade, China’s economy grew slowly, with poor living conditions
based on backward technology and little exchange within the country, let alone between China and
the world.
Because China had been closed to foreign investment since the early 1950s and exported primarily to
pay for essential imports, the value of China’s exports in 1978 was less than $7 billion – a mere 0.3
percent of their value today. This isolation contributed to China’s low living standard. Its GDP per
capita of $155 ranked 131st out of the 133 countries with reported data, just above GuineaBissau and
Nepal.
When I visited in 1976, I saw men with belts wrapped a couple of times around their waists – because
they were very thin, and perhaps because the planned economy did not produce many sizes of belts.

Renewed global connections
When Mao died in 1976, a group of leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, believed that market reforms
would revive the economy through more efficient production and better technology. China’s socalled
“opening up” officially began with the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee in December 1978.
As part of the reform strategy, China’s leaders established four special economic zones in southern
China near Hong Kong with incentives for foreign companies to invest in production aimed at
exporting. The most wellknown zone is Shenzhen, located in Guangdong Province.
At the time, U.S., Japanese and European companies were looking for new locations to manufacture
their goods cheaply after wages rose in East Asian countries like Hong Kong, South Korea and
Taiwan. And few other countries were welcoming to foreign investment. India, for example, remained
closed to foreign direct investment for another decade.
In other words, China’s policies changed at a fortuitous time.
Companies moved quickly to China, especially across the border from Hong Kong, giving birth to
deep manufacturing capacity that became the center of the world’s supply chain. By 2006, foreign
companies were generating nearly 60 percent of China’s exports and even today produce close to 43
percent of them.

https://theconversation.com/whatchinasexportmachinecanteachtrumpaboutglobalization63608
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Guess what? It’s all made in China. Reuters/Kevin Lamarque

The power of specialization
China’s export story is a lesson in the power of globalization for development. Specifically, China’s
policies leveraged its comparative advantage.
It attracted foreign direct investment with incentives to export, which included an undervalued
exchange rate and a large population willing to work for relatively low wages. The returns to this
investment were used for infrastructure, education, R&D and institutionbuilding. This focus on
domestic capabilities supported growth and rising living standards, avoiding a “middle income trap”
where a country is not able to move its production beyond the lower end of the value chain.
Over time, Chinese domestic businesses became increasingly competitive as they developed
management skills and market knowledge. Even small domestic firms have grown their exports in
recent years as a result of access to international ecommerce platforms such as Alibaba.
China’s embrace of global merchandise trade and capital markets has transformed it into a middle
income country with a GDP of almost $8,000 per capita in current U.S. dollars, and the largest
producer of manufactured goods in the world.
Chinese families now have enough income to travel the world. Chinese tourists are expected to soon
be the biggest spenders on travel. Meanwhile, laborintensive, lowwage manufacturing is moving to
new opportunities in Bangladesh, Vietnam, Cambodia and elsewhere, and the composition of China’s
exports is changing from textiles, furniture and toys to sophisticated pumps, electronics and engines.
China is successfully moving up the value chain.

The next stage and lessons for the U.S.
https://theconversation.com/whatchinasexportmachinecanteachtrumpaboutglobalization63608
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Going forward, however, exports are not likely to dominate China’s development process. Its outward
investments will. Chinese companies are investing worldwide. The value of their investments outside
of China reached $1 trillion in 2015, up from just $57 billion a decade ago. Some analysts expect it to
double by 2020.
The impact of Chinese companies investing abroad looks likely to be as big, or bigger, than that of its
exports. Chinese outward investment is growing very fast both because of industry conditions within
China, loosening of constraints on outward investment by its leaders and growing capabilities on the
part of business managers.
In just the U.S., already Chinese companies have invested an estimated $64 billion and employ
100,000 people. So while we will continue to buy goods “made in China,” we will increasingly work
with, and for, these very same companies.
That is, if we are lucky. If the next administration carries out its campaign promises, then the U.S.
may miss out on many of the benefits of foreign investment all together from China and elsewhere,
such as revitalized towns with new jobs and taxpaying businesses.
In recent decades, the U.S. helped China join the global market system through corporate investment
and government policy. Both countries benefited tremendously.
The irony is that China has learned its isolation lesson and is now promoting trade agreements that
will substitute for the ones that the U.S. may leave on the table, such as NAFTA and the TransPacific
Partnership. And if the U.S. begins a trade war with China, then all bets are off. Not only will new jobs
not materialize, but the lowcost goods we have enjoyed will be much more expensive, and our
growing exports to China will no doubt be hurt by Chinese retaliation.
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